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Global Capitalism
Fabio Vighi
Abstract: The article argues that Lacan’s understanding of the 
capitalist discourse should be framed within the ongoing crisis of 
valorisation, where for the first time in the history of capitalism the 
impact of automation causes the economy’s operating logic to backfire. 
Contemporary capitalism’s crippling inability to generate the necessary 
mass of economic value required for the reproduction of our societies 
can be fully appreciated by reconstructing Lacan’s critique of labour qua 
value-fetish, the specific ruse through which capitalism fictionalises the 
uncountable (unconscious) dimension of any “knowledge at work”. By 
triangulating between Lacan, Marx and Hegel, this piece seeks to reflect 
on the empty core of the capital-labour dialectic. The next step will be 
to explore the capitalist symptom as obdurate form of resistance to the 
transformation of an exhausted and increasingly self-destructive mode of 
production.
Keywords: Lacan, capitalist discourse, Marx, Hegel, mode of production, 
labour, value critique.
‘Nothing can change our life but the gradual insinuation 
within us of the forces which annihilate it.’1
 
1. Bad news as good news?
In the Introduction to his latest book, Like a Thief in Broad Daylight, 
Slavoj Žižek engages with, among other things, the impact of techno-
scientific development on the resilience of our big Other, Jacques 
Lacan’s name for the commonly shared, unwritten and naturalised 
symbolic rules sustaining our social space. As he explicitly puts it: 
‘The progress of today’s sciences destroys the basic presuppositions 
of our everyday notion of reality’.2 After listing various reactions to 
this calamitous predicament – the ideologically worst of which being 
New Age obscurantism – Žižek performs his most cherished Hegelian 
manoeuvre: the speculative pirouette from negativity (our ‘New 
World Disorder, this gradually emerging word-less civilization’)3 to 
transformation via retroactive resignification (the opening up of the 
space of an event which signals the possibility of radical emancipation). 
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be argued that Žižek’s standard 
Hegelian reasoning lies in his claim that only the confrontation with the 
void/emptiness of our situation will encourage us to think again, i.e. to 
1 Cioran 2012, p. 16. 
2 Žižek 2018, p. 4. 
3 Ibid, p. 5.
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engage in the battle for a different/better socio-symbolic order. Or, as 
Žižek puts it in his latest metaphorical dressing: the bad news is already 
the good news. This captures in a nutshell not only one of Žižek’s most 
widely rehearsed dialectical points but, probably, also the fundamental 
contribution of his philosophical thought, which in Lacan’s parlance I am 
tempted to characterise in terms of jouissance: an irresistible coercion to 
repeat, a form of libidinal attachment to a specific idea that constitutes 
the very core of his cogito.4 So, what is new about all this? 
The novelty comes when Žižek mentions, arguably for the first time 
in his immense output, ‘the prospect of automatization of production, 
which will – so people fear – radically diminish the need for workers 
and thus make unemployment explode’.5 I confess that I had long been 
waiting for Žižek to tackle what I regard as the problem of our global-
capitalist (dis-)order. For if the silent presuppositions of our everyday 
reality are rapidly losing their symbolic efficiency, slowly evaporating 
before our very eyes, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the direct 
cause of this de-realisation of our lives is contemporary capitalism’s 
growing inability to churn out the necessary mass of economic value 
required for the reproduction of our social machine. In Marxian terms – 
through a radical reassessment of his theory of “tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall”, exposed in Capital volume 3 – we would say that, due to the 
unheard-of technological advance over the last 40 years or so, capital 
finds itself increasingly embarrassed vis-à-vis its mission of squeezing 
surplus-value out of the exploitation of labour-power. Lacan alluded at 
this embarrassment in a prophetic passage of Seminar XVI (session 
of 19 March 1969), when he argued that capitalism introduced ‘liberal 
power’ in order to mask its being ‘against power’, that is to say against 
any form of political power that might attempt to challenge its dynamic of 
self-expansion. Lacan’s point is simple and even fairly obvious from our 
standpoint: in modern liberal democracies, ‘power is elsewhere’; it is not 
to be found in politics, but in the dominance of the economy over politics. 
While Lacan claims that the 1917 Russian revolution was essentially a 
(failed) attempt to ‘restore the functions of power’ over the discourse of 
the economy, he points out that this situation
 
‘is not easy to hold onto, precisely because in the time when 
capitalism reigns, capitalism reigns because it is closely 
connected with this rise in the function of science. Only even 
this power, this camouflaged power, this secret and, it must 
also be said, anarchic power, I mean divided against itself, and 
4 For Lacan, the Cartesian cogito, the kernel of modern rationality, is the unconscious. See for exam-
ple Lacan’s texts ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Freudian Unconscious’ and ‘Science and Truth’ (in 
Lacan 2006a, pp. 412-41 and 726-45 respectively). 
5 Žižek 2018, p. 6.
this without any doubt through its being clothed with this rise 
of science, it is as embarrassed as a fish on a bicycle now.’6 
This passage is worth pondering. Capitalism, Lacan avers, is a form of 
‘camouflaged power’ whose intimate nature is self-destructive (‘divided 
against itself’), as a consequence of its being strictly conjoined with the 
epistemology of modern science. In fact, Lacan continues, ‘something is 
happening in the science quarter, something that transcends its capacity 
for mastery’. The embarrassment of contemporary capitalist societies, 
driven by the ‘curious copulation’ between capitalism and science, as he 
will put it in Seminar XVII,7 lies precisely in the fact that, all of a sudden, 
the reference to the capacity of the big Other to provide symbolic cover 
(alienation) for our lives weakens dramatically. Hence the significance 
of Lacan’s warning to the subversive students of 1968 that all they aspire 
to is a new master.8 Except for the revolutionary spirit of those years, 
the situation described by Lacan in March 1969 is still our situation. The 
erosion of the big Other, which began when societies fuelled by capitalist 
value started losing their capacity for self-mastery, today reaches new 
heights due to the devastating impact of technological innovation on the 
valorisation dogma of the capitalist mode of production. To use one of 
Lacan’s most popular mottos, we could say that the copulation between 
science and capital today misfires, revealing that there is “no such 
thing as a sexual relationship” between them, but only an embarrassed 
impotence, which is hardly covered up by the reactionary strategies of 
denial popping up everywhere on our political horizon. 
My Lacanian perspective on crisis invites me to explore the extent 
to which the ongoing implosion of our socio-symbolic constellation, 
coupled with the predictable return of political authoritarianism, is 
nothing but the mode of appearance of the terminal sickness of its 
economic logic, which in its blind hunger for profitability ironically 
undermines the basic condition of its own reproduction, namely the 
exploitation of human labour. In an exemplary case of what Hegel 
called the “cunning of reason”, it is as if contemporary capitalism was 
desperate to show us that it does not need any rebellious opposition; it 
can destroy itself much more efficiently on its own. Precisely at its point 
of maximum expansion and ideological triumph, the capitalist mode of 
production reveals its fundamental loneliness and vulnerability. This point 
is by now widely shared by thinkers of diverse political and ideological 
persuasions. Jeremy Rifkin, for instance – the staunch defender of 
6 Lacan 2006b. 
7 Lacan 2007, p. 110.
8 Here is the well-known passage: ‘the revolutionary aspiration has only a single possible outcome 
– of ending up as the master’s discourse. This is what experience has proved. What you aspire to as 
revolutionaries is a master. You will get one’ (Lacan 2007, p. 202).
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“collaborative commons” – has for some time insisted that ‘[c]apitalism’s 
operating logic is designed to fail by succeeding’, insofar as ‘intense 
competition forces the introduction of ever-leaner technology’ which 
boosts productivity, reduces marginal costs to near zero and with it the 
global mass of profits. This prompts the following deduction: 
‘Ironically, capitalism’s decline is not coming at the hands of 
hostile forces. There are no hordes at the front gates ready 
to tear down the walls of the capitalist edifice. Quite the 
contrary. What’s undermining the capitalist system is the 
dramatic success of the very operating assumptions that 
govern it. At the heart of capitalism there lies a contradiction 
in the driving mechanism that has propelled it ever upward to 
commanding heights, but now is speeding it to its death.’9
The embarrassment of which Lacan spoke comes precisely from this 
paradoxical coincidence of success and failure, power and impotence, 
against the background of the perfect fit between technology and 
capitalist accumulation. Today, Marx’s insight that the limit of capitalism 
is capital itself rings truer than ever, since it is not met by the dream 
(turned nightmare) of a higher social order (Communism) but by the 
cunning silence of reason, which allows for the free deployment of 
capital’s full (self-destructive) potential. For Hegel, power is truly 
antagonised only when we ‘make it return into itself as movement, so that 
it negates itself.’ In other words, ‘silence is the worst, vilest cunning’,10 
which is exactly was Lacan had in mind when he formulated his discourse 
of the analyst: the analysand, faced by the silent cunning of the analyst, 
unravels all by herself, that is to say she talks and talks until she is 
confronted by the meaninglessness of her symptom, which in a crucial 
move she has a chance to assume. Yet the big question is: (when) will 
capitalism assume its symptom? Or, perhaps more pointedly: is not 
capitalism already its own symptom?
These initial considerations are meant to introduce a Lacanian 
approach to the radical ambiguity surrounding the future of our societies. 
To make sense of such seemingly irreducible ambiguity, let us begin with 
the following hypothesis: in itself, the capitalist discourse as discussed 
by Lacan is divided between its drive, which engenders an intrinsically 
traumatic deregulation of the social bond in which it proliferates, and 
a strategy of self-containment inscribed within its astute logic of self-
valorisation, where the value-fetish disguises the intrinsic impotence 
(void, emptiness) of the signifying chain. While commentators have 
9 Rifkin 2014, pp. 2-4. See also Rifkin 2011. 
10 In Rauch 1983, p. 104. On this point see also Žižek 2013, pp. 510-11.
tended to emphasise the former dimension, Lacan, as we shall see, 
endorses both aspects: the specific type of capitalist alienation lies in 
its centrifugal or de-territorialising impetus coupled with the centripetal 
or re-territorialising logic of valorisation, where every aspect of life is 
mediated by economic value. At the same time, Lacan intimates that such 
balancing act is undermined beyond repair by contemporary capitalism’s 
alliance with technological innovation: it runs very fast, ‘comme sur 
des roulettes’ (as if on wheels), and yet ‘ça se consomme si bien que 
ça se consume’ (it consumes itself to the point of consumption).11 What 
is alluded to here has become self-evident today: the new levels of 
automation in production unwittingly call the bluff of the valorisation 
fetish, thus showing how – in Lacan’s terms – surplus-value (Mehrwert) 
was always surplus-jouissance (Mehrlust), namely the empty core and 
potential breaking point within the logic of self-expansion.12 
In his brief mention of automation, Žižek liquidates the real 
prospect of mass technological unemployment in a couple of, ultimately, 
rather superficial lines: ‘But why fear this prospect? Does it not open up 
the possibility of a new society in which we all have to work much less? In 
what kind of society do we live, where good news is automatically turned 
into bad news?’13 These rhetorical questions effectively work against a 
background of disavowal: while most of us would, in principle at least, 
welcome a society where there is less work to do, the point is that such 
prospect clashes rather ominously with the overwhelming evidence that 
the capitalist valorisation process, based as it is on the extraction of 
surplus-value from wage labour, continues to be regarded as the only 
possible fuel on which to run the social machine. The urgent issue for 
us is therefore to think how to reconfigure a work-society that, despite 
the increasingly self-evident ineffectiveness of its productive turbine, 
blindly continues to stick with it as a matter of – let us say it with Lacan 
– jouissance. Despite the prospect of implosion and potential change, 
value-fetishism for profit-making will remain our only existential horizon 
unless we manage to politicise its failure and demise. What I want to 
discuss in this essay is the Marxian question of the relationship between 
11 Lacan 1978, p. 36. 
12 There is a vast literature on the impact of automation on value-production. For a specific Lacano-
Marxian approach, see Feldner and Vighi 2015.
13 Žižek 2018, p. 6. In truth, in the first chapter of his book Žižek develop a deeper reading of the explo-
sive contradictions that are leading us toward what he calls “posthuman capitalism”. The progressive 
decomposition of our socio-symbolic order, however, is only briefly correlated with the unstoppable 
de-valuation of value that is affecting and afflicting contemporary capitalist societies. While Žižek 
mentions in passing the effects of technological unemployment, with millions of people relegated 
to the role of marginal/excluded subjects whose relation to capital is increasingly no longer that of 
traditional exploitation as denounced by Marx, i.e. mediated by the valorisation process, but one of 
direct personal domination, i.e. slavery, he does not develop the analysis of the cause, namely capital-
ism’s continuing, obdurate reliance on the valorisation fetish (wage labour) despite its increasingly 
catastrophic ineffectiveness in an automated society. 
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value-creation and value-fetishism, a question that Lacan himself had 
tackled in the late 1960s.
2. A new master?
Lacan’s fifth discourse – the discourse of capitalism – was meant to 
capture the novelty of a social formation whose fundamental purpose is 
to turn the deadlock or negativity of any discourse into a positive object 
of enjoyment/consumption. Through this extraordinary prestidigitation, 
capitalism promises no less than to deliver the modern subject from 
castration, that is to say from the experience of lack, alienation and 
frustration brought in by the law. While the promise of a systemic and 
universal foreclosure of castration marks a major shift in the modern 
subject’s libidinal economy, at the same time it is functional to the 
hegemonic affirmation and planetary triumph of the capitalist lust 
for self-expansion, the sole raison d’être of a blind, acephalous and 
intrinsically (self-)destructive economic dynamism where, as we shall 
see, the negativity of the social bond is recuperated as its disavowed 
cause. 
As anticipated, Lacan grasps the dual nature of capitalism, which 
constitutes its internal contradiction. On the one hand, as a radically new 
type of mastery, capitalism promises paradise on earth: it claims to make 
no attempt at delimiting the subject’s freedom within power edifices 
erected upon symbolic authority and prohibition; rather, it stealthily 
imposes commodified enjoyment as a new form of superego authority. 
This is how the discourse of the capitalist attempts to revolutionise 
the structural logic of the four discourses (Master, University, Analyst 
and Hysteric), which are generated by the anticlockwise quarter-turn 
rotation of a signifying chain whose constant feature is the production of 
an impasse (surplus/lack) that cannot be absorbed within signification. 
Capitalism, on the contrary, aspires to be a paradoxical discourse without 
discourse, thus setting up a worldless world, a free and disalienated 
global community entirely substantiated by the freedom to consume 
(commodity fetishism). What matters in this scenario is less the actual 
satisfaction of the drives than the imposition of the generalised illusion 
that the human animal is essentially selfish, narcissistic and hedonistic.14 
Although the illusion informing such capitalist utopia may be more 
readily associated with the contemporary hegemony of neoliberalism and 
financial capitalism,15 there is little doubt that it had already quickened 
the pulse of classical economists like Adam Smith, whose notorious 
metaphor of the invisible hand of the market pointed precisely in the 
direction of such an autonomous and scintillating scenario. 
14 On this point see especially McGowan 2003. 
15 See for instance Tomšič 2015.
While Lacan’s discussions of capitalism are often aimed at 
denouncing its perverse ideological core, I argue that the significance of 
his contribution lies elsewhere, namely in the signalling of capitalism’s 
self-destructiveness. Although Lacan’s capitalist discourse is mostly 
read as a diabolical contraption for subjective capture,16 it seems to me 
more auspicious to reflect on Lacan’s warnings that the capitalist project 
is destined to fail precisely by succeeding. The two dimensions, of course, 
are dialectically intertwined. The more capital manages to manipulate, 
regiment and tame people’s desires, the more it is haunted by its own 
drive. It is, however, the ultimate impotence of this drive that a Lacanian 
reading of capitalism should emphasise. Today, when the triumphant 
historical march of the economy has spectacularly annihilated all 
potentially antagonistic ideologies, and the enjoyment of the value-fetish 
has acquired global traction, we are presented with a remarkably unique 
situation, one where the capitalist genie has found its way out of the 
bottle and is faced only by itself – by the libidinal core of its own restless 
dynamism. While in this scenario the economic compulsion is able to visit 
all its cynical indifference upon a social bond that in many parts of the 
world is already on the verge of collapse, it also reveals its own systemic 
impotence. It is this novelty that should energize us into thinking a 
different version of the social bond. The impotence radiating from the 
cold heart of contemporary capitalism, which is both internal (mode of 
production) and external (ecology), should not simply be negated, but 
actively integrated within a new political project that prioritises our 
collective destiny – not in the name of a utopian future, but of our radical 
finitude. The possibility of this thinking, however, is precisely what our 
politics seems doggedly bent on preventing. 
If we briefly consider the ongoing political debate between neo-
Keynesian and neoliberal approaches to the economy and its crisis 
(the stimulus vs. austerity debate), we cannot but be stricken by how 
hopelessly outmoded and inconsequential our political narratives 
are. This is because both approaches share the same presupposition 
that capital is an inexhaustible wellspring whose point of origin is not 
human but divine. In today’s politics, questioning the finitude of such 
wellspring is like questioning the existence of God for a believer – it is 
simply impossible, regardless of how much evidence to the contrary 
one collects. Yet, while this debate continues to excite our political 
elites and their followers worldwide, its real function would best be 
sought in its (fetishistic) disavowal of the truly cardinal question that 
may save our future: how can we reconfigure our hopelessly debilitated 
mode of production? The capitalist drive is already beyond any possible 
containment or repair, which is why, at some point, we will begin to feel 
16 See, among others, Lesourd 2006; Declercq 2006; Olivier 2009; Sauret 2009; McGowan 2003 and 2016; 
Verhaeghe 2014; de Castro 2016; Žižek 2016; Pauwels 2019.
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the unbearable urge to politicise the push for an exit strategy. In this 
respect, capital’s own ever-increasing flight into the financial sector, 
where “money makes money work” instead of human labour, is nothing 
but the forward-escape route through which the capitalist discourse 
seeks to overcome its inherent imbalance, which should be understood 
in its precise historical context: the terminal phase of a long-winded 
dynamic of reckless self-expansion which commenced when human 
beings started “freely” to sell their ability to work. 
This also means that Marx’s concept of labour-power is still central 
to the understanding of our deadlock. In fact, everything turns around the 
specific capitalist “fictionalisation” of labour-power – the way in which 
capital turns the negative materiality of human praxis into a positive, 
fictitious entity which it then places at the heart of its mode of production. 
It is no surprise, then, that when Lacan identified this ruse he started to 
refer to capitalism as the new master. The specific ‘cunning’ of capitalist 
capture, according to Lacan,17 lies in the way traditional mastery is 
relinquished and at the same time powerfully reasserted precisely in its 
relinquished form, as an objective, neutral and continuously hystericized 
knowledge. Lacan’s point here is that while the traditional master relied 
on the efficacy of its symbolic authority, the new capitalist master 
functions by disavowing such authority, that is to say by delegating it to 
the impersonal objectivity of its modus operandi. So, what has labour got 
to do with all this? Lacan’s crucial insight, developed throughout Seminar 
XVI and Seminar XVII, is that labour-power should be understood 
not merely as the expenditure of a certain amount of human energy 
predated upon by capital, but as the unconscious know-how (savoir-
faire) possessed by the slave/artisan of pre-capitalist times – an opaque 
knowledge the traditional master knew nothing (and could not care less) 
about. 
The knowledge in question is not to be understood pedagogically 
as a set of skills, but has to do instead with the awareness that ‘getting 
to know something always happens in a flash’;18 which means, essentially, 
that knowledge is inseparable from what it lacks, namely the unconscious. 
Of course, it could not be otherwise for Lacan: insofar as it is supported 
by the signifier, knowledge by definition strikes against the wall of its 
own negative/lacking substance, thereby yielding an entropic surplus, 
a meaningless leftover, a surplus-jouissance that, as such, cannot be 
counted. By claiming that knowledge is a means of jouissance, then, 
Lacan suggests that, when at work, it generates a point of loss, a 
residue of entropic waste that is ultimately irreducible to valorisation.19 
17  Lacan 1978, p. 36.
18 Lacan 2006b, session of 26 February 1969.
19 I have developed this point in Vighi 2010, pp. 39-58. 
It is the original opacity of knowledge that is scientifically fictionalised 
by capitalism, that is to say quantified in order to be invested into the 
accumulation cycle. All of a sudden, savoir-faire acquires visibility and 
agency, as it is bought and sold in the market. This paradoxical operation, 
which puts valorised labour-power in the driving seat, undermines 
traditional mastery by replacing it with the value-fetish, whose dual 
nature resides in its claiming neutrality and objectivity (the quantification 
and computability of modern “knowledge at work”) while also providing 
a fetishistic solution (the commodity) to the subjective logic of desire 
that continues to fuel the scientific foundations of modernity (“Keep 
knowing!”/”Keep consuming!’’). 
Simply put, while in traditional societies work only mattered insofar 
as it got done, and value resided elsewhere (in forms of symbolic authority 
related to prestige, social class and religion), with the advent of capitalism 
work progressively becomes the only value, in the specific sense that it 
begins to be counted, quantified, packaged (the University discourse of 
modern science), and turned into that unique commodity (the Capitalist 
discourse) around which the social reproducibility of modern societies is 
articulated. In Lacan’s words: 
‘Work has never been given such credit ever since humanity 
has existed. It is even out of the question that one not work. This 
is surely an accomplishment of what I am calling the master’s 
discourse. […] I am speaking of this capital mutation, also, 
which gives the master’s discourse its capitalist style.’20 
Lacan’s key intuition consists in highlighting how the ascendancy and 
eventual triumph of valorised wage labour qua new form of capitalist 
mastery was the result of a particular shift in the social link’s relation to the 
entropy it generates. This new relation begins to impose itself historically 
and epistemologically with the arrival of modern science and it is based on 
the assumption that the unconscious (the unknown roots of “knowledge at 
work”) can be not only known objectively, but also computed and exchanged 
with money. It is through this minimal but crucial fictional construct – a 
specific type of alienation – that the capitalist mode of production begins to 
impose its new mastery over human communities. 
As described by Marx in Capital, the capitalist process of value-
creation is the expression of a social relation of exploitation where the 
metabolism between man and nature, qua wage work, is entirely subsumed 
under the logic of capitalist accumulation. This is a paradigm-shift that 
sets up capital as a socially synthetic category. In his reading of Marx’s 
labour theory of value, Lacan comments that at the dawn of the capitalist 
revolution those who do the work are not merely spoliated of surplus labour-
20 Lacan 2007, p. 168.
Lacan and the Loneliness of Global CapitalismLacan and the Loneliness of Global Capitalism
400 401
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 6 /
Issue 1
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 6 /
Issue 1
time, but more importantly they are robbed of their singular knowledge-
at-work: ‘The proletariat is not simply exploited, he has been stripped of 
his function of knowledge’.21 Oddly enough, this point is often missed by 
Lacanians. As anticipated, the historical novelty brought in by capitalism 
is its ambition to transform uncountable savoir-faire into “commodified 
knowledge”, a measurable amount of work that feeds into the narrative 
of surplus-value and profit formation. The forcing of this valorisation 
programme constitutes the particular form of alienation introduced by the 
capitalist mode of production. 
The simple act through which, at a certain point in our history, money 
was exchanged for labour-power, thereby beginning to morph into the 
specific money-form we call capital, corresponds, according to Lacan, to an 
extraordinary epistemological revolution that inaugurates a new discourse 
based on what we might call, metaphorising a fashionable term, an act 
of recycling. In Seminar XVI Lacan tells us that capital’s glorious course 
begins with the imperceptible conversion of surplus-jouissance into a 
countable value, which destabilises the until then solid foundations of the 
discourse of the Master: 
‘Something changed in the master’s discourse at a certain 
point in history. We are not going to break our backs finding out 
if it was because of Luther, Calvin or some unknown traffic of 
ships around Genoa, or in the Mediterranean Sea, or anywhere 
else, for the important point is that on a certain day surplus 
jouissance became calculable, could be counted, totalized. This 
is where what is called the accumulation of capital begins.’22 
The important point, for Lacan, was the mutation of what was until then 
discounted, repressed, relegated to a position of shameful unworthiness 
within the social link (the unconscious roots of the human being’s labouring 
capacity), into something visible, quantifiable and central to the new 
discourse (valorised wage labour). All of a sudden, ‘we are in the field of 
values’, and 
‘from that moment on, by virtue of the fact that the clouds of 
impotence have been aired, the master signifier only appears 
even more unassailable […]. Where is it? How can it be named? 
How can it be located? – other than through its murderous 
effects, of course. Denounce imperialism? But how can this 
little mechanism be stopped?’23 
21 Ibid, p. 149.
22 Ibid, p. 177.
23 Ibid, pp. 177-78.
Lacan’s questions are genuinely open toward the future and not 
rhetorical. The capitalist for Lacan is the new master whose discourse 
has internalised the symbolic authority (and violence) of traditional 
mastery into the minimal structural shift through which labour becomes 
labour by being valorised. Fundamentally, the capitalist master delegates 
its power (and violence) to the structure it sets up, which is, at its core, 
a headless dynamism fuelled by the incessant valorisation of labour-
power. Thus, the ‘clouds of impotence’ disappear as traditional mastery 
morphs into the dogma of valorisation, which rapidly imposes itself as 
modernity’s second nature. Insofar as the traditional master coincided 
with the phallic function, its inconsistency and vulnerability were always 
available, since for Lacan the symbolic phallus is, ultimately, the signifier 
of lack pertaining to the human being qua effect of language.24 While it is 
precisely through its meaninglessness that phallic (symbolic) mastery 
functions (by providing an anchoring point to the endless sliding of 
the signifying chain), the veil of such meaninglessness can be lifted 
at any given moment, which would expose the master’s imposture and 
fundamental impotence. What becomes invisible and therefore virtually 
unassailable with the advent of capitalism is precisely the inconsistency 
of the master. 
This paradigm shift, of course, becomes particularly apparent with 
neoliberal ideology, where workers increasingly transmute into their own 
bosses, fully internalising the authority and command of the traditional 
master, whose ‘clouds of impotence’ are thus truly aired. This way, 
discipline becomes self-discipline, and the externally imposed valorisation 
of labour becomes self-valorisation, as workers are increasingly co-opted 
into measuring their own productivity. The escalation of what Moore and 
Robinson call the ‘quantified self’25 – the self-evaluation of productivity 
through online tools tracking everything from fitness activities to calories 
ingested and sleeping patterns – is the latest form taken by capital’s 
founding act of valorisation. When life itself turns into a relentless process 
of vigilant and aggressive self-quantification, capitalist ideology becomes 
total, and arguably reaches its tipping point. However, neoliberalism 
has not altered the elementary capitalist matrix; it has only produced a 
different model of its aggressiveness. It is therefore a mistake to attack 
neoliberalism without acknowledging in its excesses the persistence of 
the original act of capitalist capture, which has always driven the logic of 
accumulation. While the 1970s post-Fordist restructuring of employment 
relations has been critiqued in various ways by many prominent scholars,26 
24 See Lacan’s ‘Signification of the Phallus’, in Lacan 2006, pp. 575-84. For an excellent reading of 
Lacan’s text, see McGowan 2019, pp. 1-20.
25 Moore & Robinson 2015. 
26 See, among others, Lazzarato 1996; Virno 2004; Chiapello and Boltanski 2007; Berardi 2009; Dean 
2009; Fleming 2009; Spicer 2013.
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it would be wise to remind ourselves that such shift reveals nothing but 
the axiomatic principle of the capitalist discourse tout court, namely, 
in Lacan’s terms, the specific way in which the capitalist relation 
fictionalises the real of jouissance by turning it into the engine of its mode 
of production (and social reproduction). The reason why thinkers like 
Michael Hardt and Toni Negri argue that cognitive labour has the potential 
to self-valorise autonomously from the capitalist colonisation of work is, 
arguably, that they do not recognise how deeply the capitalist matrix is 
at work in its neoliberal version. Any instance of self-valorisation within 
a world dominated by capitalist relations is necessarily valorisation for 
capitalist ends, namely a way of counting what does not count. Rather than 
opening up lines of flight from capital, the pandemic shift toward cognitive 
labour should be framed within the rise of the “self-quantification 
society”, which is revealing of the extent to which the valorisation dogma 
has totalised our lives. Our perverse obsession with “counting life” 
(calories, steps, heartbeats, etc.) is one with the paradigm-changing 
ruse that turns labour-power into a countable entity; they are basically 
the same thing, which also means that we would be mistaken in blaming 
technology alone. In December 1969, Lacan famously warned the students 
of the autonomous, “Marxist-Leninist” University of Vincennes (Paris 
VIII) that the introduction of credit points in higher education had the 
effect of reducing knowledge to a numerical unit for the purpose of making 
it marketable, just like any other commodity.27 Whether credit points of 
fitness tracker bracelets, what is at stake is the same epistemological 
operation whereby the unknown roots of signification are translated into a 
measurable unit which, on the strength of its presumed self-transparency, 
must be valorised and accumulated.  
Already in Seminar XII (1964-65), Lacan had claimed that capitalist 
accumulation was, in its deepest configuration, an accumulation of 
knowledge, insofar as the problem of the unconscious truth of the subject 
(savoir insu, knowledge that does not know itself) was being removed: 
‘From Descartes on, knowledge, that of science, is constituted 
on the mode of the production of knowledge. Just as an 
essential stage of our structure which is called social, but 
which is in reality metaphysical and is called capitalism, is the 
accumulation of capital, so is the relationship of the Cartesian 
subject to that being which is affirmed in it, founded on the 
accumulation of knowledge. Knowledge from Descartes on is 
what can serve to increase knowledge. And this is a completely 
different question to that of the truth.’28 
27 Lacan 2007, pp. 197-208.
28 Lacan 1964-65. 
On the one hand, Lacan’s claim suggests that, far from being 
potentially liberating, the shift toward cognitive capitalism leads us out 
of the frying pan into the fire, since (as emphatically demonstrated, for 
instance, by the metrics mania in our education systems) what triggered 
the capitalist revolution was precisely the spurious computation of 
knowledge. On the other hand, Lacan’s critique brings into focus 
the epistemological overlapping of capitalism and modern science, 
inasmuch as it emphasises how the birth of the capitalism coincided 
with the arrival on the scene of the new scientific method that is best 
represented not only by Descartes but especially by Isaac Newton and 
his depiction of the universe as a clockwork mechanism of actions and 
reactions, causes and effects.
The novelty of modern science (since the 17th century), which 
forcefully manifests itself in the capitalist computation of work, is for 
Lacan the novelty of a signifying articulation that attempts to foreclose 
the subject of the unconscious – the subject that reveals itself in the 
‘stumblings’ and ‘intervals’ of discourse, where ‘a truth is announced 
to me where I do not protect myself from what comes in my word’.29 
However, Lacan is keen to emphasise the inherent impossibility of 
this operation. For instance, in his reading of the scientific revolution 
of Newtonian physics, through which all divine shadows are expelled 
from the heavens,30 Lacan notes how the subject, although foreclosed, 
is also secretly presupposed. That is to say, the Newtonian formula 
hypotheses non fingo (I do not need causes to describe phenomena, for 
I only describe them) ‘presupposes in itself a subject who maintains the 
action of the law’, since ‘the operation of gravity does not appear to him 
[Newton] to be able to be supported except by this pure and supreme 
subject, this sort of acme of the ideal subject that the Newtonian God 
represents.’31 This presupposition of a subject who believes rather 
than simply who knows, signals the inherent yet profoundly disavowed 
fallibility of the new social bond. Although the historical development 
of modern science in its alliance with capitalism progressively negates 
such fallibility, this does not mean that the latter disappears. Rather, it 
continues to haunt the flat ontology of our time.
3. Collapse of a frictionless discourse?
In the early 1970s Lacan claimed that, despite being very clever, the 
well-oiled, ever-accelerating capitalist machine was heading for self-
destruction. The French word he used to indicate the implosion of 
capitalism was crevaison (“puncture”), which aptly conveys the image 
29 Ibid, session of 5 May 1965.
30 Ibid, session of 12 May 1965.
31 Ibid.
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of a mechanism breaking down, being suddenly forced to halt its course. 
But why should the smooth and frictionless discours du capitaliste suffer 
such a lethal accident? Lacan began by endorsing Marx’s claim that 
capital is an “automatic subject” (automatisches Subjekt): the capitalist 
accumulation dynamic, as an impersonal compulsion to generate ever-
increasing amounts of profit, is in a constant state of overexcitement, 
or overdrive. In this respect, in his 1915 essay ‘Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes’ Freud had already noted that the aim of the drive is not 
its object (in our case, profit-making) but rather the endless circuital 
gravitation around the object, which brings satisfaction not by obtaining 
but by missing the target. Lacan endorsed Freud’s view in Seminar XI, 
claiming that ‘no object of any […] need, can satisfy the drive […]. This 
is what Freud tells us […]. As far as the object in the drive is concerned, 
let it be clear that it is strictly speaking of no importance. It is a matter of 
total indifference.’32 
In capitalism, satisfaction comes precisely from never realizing 
enough profit: the more profit one makes, the more one becomes aware 
of not having enough of it, that is to say of lacking it, which triggers the 
compulsive repetition of the same sovereign gesture of accumulation. As 
with any form of addiction, the satisfaction of the drive coincides with its 
missing the target. The paradox is that the moment we get some of it, we 
are immediately overwhelmed by the awareness that we lack it, and thus 
that we want more. As with any pathological dependence, we are addicted 
to the lacking object, that is to say the object as lack. The splitting of the 
drive between object and aim is of fundamental importance if we are to 
grasp the contradictory nature of capitalist accumulation from a Lacanian 
perspective. While a capitalist consciously craves profit, what she really 
wants is not having (enough of) it, so that she can continue to crave it. 
It goes without saying that this unconscious elevation of lack as the 
driver of the capitalist logic of accumulation clashes with the conscious 
targeting of profit, making capitalism blind to its own cause. Incidentally, 
the result of this blindness is signalled in the lower part of Lacan’s 
discourse of the capitalist, where surplus-value qua surplus-jouissance 
(a) is unable to establish any connection with the master-signifier (S1). 
The main implication is that the capitalist cycle of accumulation, 
which cares only about its own self-reproduction, remains ignorant as 
to how surplus-value works as its lacking substance. Instead of nothing, 
the capitalist sees a value. It is precisely because it is fundamentally 
not there, then, that Lacan renames surplus-value (Marx’s Mehrwert) 
as Mehrlust (surplus-jouissance), a libidinal object whose pulsating, 
intermittent presence dissimulates its own real absence – a kind of 
equivalent of the proverbial empty eye of the hurricane; or, as Lacan 
put it poetically in his short essay ‘On Freud’s Trieb’, ‘the colour of 
32 Lacan 1998, pp. 167-68. 
emptiness, suspended in the light of a gap’.33 Lacan’s critical point was 
that Marx, by conceding that labour is, ultimately, a quantifiable economic 
value subsumable in temporal terms, stopped too soon in his critique 
of surplus-value, neglecting ‘the initial stage of its articulation’,34 and 
thereby endorsing the scientific presuppositions of modern economic 
thought in general. 
Lacan was deeply aware that Marx’s critique of political economy 
came about in relation to two distinct methodological pressures: the 
idealist philosophical model asserted by Hegel, and the positivist 
approach to scientific knowledge that became overwhelmingly dominant 
in the second half of the 19th century. Let us recall that in his theory of 
the three stages of human development, Auguste Comte – the father of 
positivism – argued that religion (the theological stage) is for children, 
philosophy (the metaphysical stage, extension of the former) for 
adolescents, and only the scientific method (positivism) for adults. His 
conviction that scientific observation, measurement and comparison 
represented the highest developmental stage for humanity was, by the 
time Comte put ink to paper, the dominant discourse of his epoch. The fact 
that Comte went on to found a secular religion based on strict principles 
and organized in a liturgical structure replete with a panoply of beliefs, 
sacraments and rituals, is highly symptomatic of the fundamentally 
hysterical character of the positivist revolution, whose urge to eliminate 
the philosophical search for causes and presuppositions generated the 
very anxiety it sought to abolish.
If we ascribe weight to the idea that Marx’s mature thought 
developed into a teleological vision of history later named “historical 
materialism”, the cause for this elaboration should be sought in the 
social pressure to conform to the dogma of his time: the injunction to 
observe the object of his critique (the capitalist mode of production) 
like a ‘physicist’ who ‘either observes natural processes where they 
occur in their most significant form, and are least affected by disturbing 
influences, or, wherever possible, he makes experiments under conditions 
which ensure that the process will occur in its pure state.’35 Marx could 
not be free from the pressure of positivism, and yet he did not give in to 
its requirements completely. Arguably, since around 1845 (The German 
Ideology) he felt increasingly obliged to incorporate into his thought 
the analytical method of positivism, which allowed him to provide an 
empirical basis for his critique of capital. At the same time, however, his 
empiricism continued to be supplemented with, and antagonized by, a 
systemic and dialectical understanding of social relations which was not 
33 Lacan 2006a, p. 722.
34 Lacan 2007, p. 108.
35 This well-known passage is from the Preface to the first edition of Capital. See Marx 1990, p. 90. 
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limited to the study of the observable, but also sought to probe entities 
and magnitudes that were not directly measurable.36 In this respect, the 
tragic dimension of Marxism is to have discovered the powerful engine of 
capitalism as source of wealth (and socio-anthropological degradation) 
while also peddling the illusion of its dialectical overcoming via the 
proletariat. What Lacan’s critique of the capitalist discourse makes 
clear is that, within the capitalist relation, there are no antagonistic 
forces (subjectivities) that might be able to overthrow capitalism; no 
Aristotelian potentiality within (the capitalistic appropriation of) labour 
that might trigger a revolutionary act. 
In short, what is missing in Marx’s labour theory of value is none 
other than the cause insofar as it is ontologically lacking: the cause, 
that is, as the negative substantiality of human “knowledge at work”, the 
unconscious substance that informs living labour and from there that 
spurious economic magnitude known as surplus-value. In his reading 
of Marx, Lacan urges Marxists to probe further into the nature of this 
surplus supposedly made of value. If they do, he contends, they would 
realise that the value-fetish is a fictional construct whose elementary role 
is to conceal not only the exploitation of labour-power, but especially the 
epochal transformation affecting the unconscious roots of knowledge. 
Precisely as a fetish, the value-form qua positive, abstract and yet terribly 
concrete measure of human labour (real abstraction) is an act of positing 
via a thoroughly contingent gesture: the purchase of labour-power. This, 
ultimately, is the sovereign capitalist gesture that surreptitiously turns 
the negative (lacking) substantiality of savoir-faire into an empirically 
measurable and exchangeable entity.
The immediate implication of this argument is that our social 
totality relies on the minimally transcendental operation we perform by 
disavowing the insubstantial character of labour-power. In the totalitarian 
reign of the value-form, fetishism (commodity consumerism), like all 
forms of perversion, functions as the minimal instance of disavowal 
that sets up our socio-ontological horizon of sense – that is to say, our 
big Other and its alienating effect. Within this paradigm, our inability to 
confront and assume the disavowed cause of the global capitalist big 
Other translates into our stubborn inability to tackle its terminal crisis at 
its roots. By definition, a fetish plugs the structural hole that constitutes 
its (impossible) truth. As anticipated, it is not merely a matter of locating 
the cause of the capitalist mode of production in its material and socio-
historical status, namely the extraction of surplus-value from the 
worker’s surplus labour-time. Rather, Lacan insists that the exploitation 
36 This central contradiction within Marx’s thought can also be framed, of course, as a conflict 
between his materialistic critique of Hegel’s speculative idealism, which he derived from Feuerbach, 
and his tendency not to jettison Hegel's dialectical method of enquiry into the self-development of 
humankind. There exists a vast critical literature on this theme, which for reasons of space cannot be 
discussed in this essay.
denounced by Marx conceals the radical inconsistency of a missing 
cause, i.e. the self-relating negativity of labour insofar as it is rooted in 
‘the gap-like structure that is the structure of the unconscious’.37
As is well known, Marx’s opening gambit in Capital volume 1 is 
to reveal how the abstraction of the exchange relation (the buying and 
selling of commodities in the market) functions through the disavowal 
of the operation that takes place “underground”, in the hidden abode of 
production. The enigmatic character of the commodity-form is famously 
captured in the fourth and final section of the first chapter of Capital 
volume 1, aptly entitled ‘The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret’. 
Here, through extensive use of esoteric terminology, Marx argues that the 
commodity is ‘a very strange thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties 
and theological niceties’; he discusses ‘the mystical character’ of 
commodities that makes them ‘sensuous things which are at the same 
time suprasensible or social’; and, most importantly, he claims that ‘this 
fetishism of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social 
character of the labour which produces them’.38 The metaphysical lure 
of the fetish-commodity as encountered in the sphere of circulation, in 
other words, has to do with the specific form of the commodity. It is this 
form that Marx reveals to be created in the sphere of production through 
a particular use of the social character of labour, namely the capitalist’s 
crafty appropriation of surplus labour-time. Thus, if the sphere of 
circulation is the ‘very Eden of the innate rights of man’, or more explicitly 
‘the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham’ 
(‘Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage’),39 Marx invites 
his readers to ‘leave this noisy sphere [circulation], where everything 
takes place on the surface and in full view of everyone’, and follow him 
‘into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there hangs the 
notice “No admittance except on business.” Here we shall see, not only 
how capital produces, but how capital is itself produced. The secret of 
profit-making must at last be laid bare.’40 
In Marx, then, the negation of the immediacy (self-sufficiency) of 
the sphere of circulation leads us straight to the sphere of production 
as its other. What emerges from this dialectical analysis is a circular 
and processual loop whereby production and circulation constantly 
presuppose each other. However, Marx’s theory arguably misses, 
eventually, the decisive passage in Hegel’s dialectics, namely the 
question of the groundlessness (or negative substantiality) of the labour-
substance in its grounding function. In other words, if labour provides 
37 Lacan 1998, p. 176.
38 Marx 1990, pp. 163-65.
39 Ibid, p. 280.
40 Ibid, pp. 279-80.
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the substantial ground for the exchange-values in circulation, the key 
Hegelian point is not only that production itself is mediated by circulation, 
but that, in “becoming labour” through its relationship with circulation, 
labour shows its essence to be groundless. What escapes Marx is the fact 
that labour constitutes not only a negation (contradiction) of capital in 
its money-form, but especially a negation of itself as negation of the latter. 
Precisely as negation of the negation of what takes place in the market, 
labour is subsumed by capital as socially substantial, i.e. it is posited 
as its presupposition. Labour therefore exercises its grounding role by 
vanishing as insubstantial mediator. The dialectical link between labour 
and value is the particular way in which the capitalist mode of production 
posits its own presuppositions, an operation involving the disappearance 
of labour as self-relating negativity.
While in pre-capitalist times the relationship between production 
and circulation was causal (from production to the market), with 
capitalism it becomes dialectical, whereby both moments come to 
presuppose each other. As is well documented, the influence of Hegel’s 
Logic of Science on Marx’s critique of political economy is particular 
noticeable in some passages of the Grundrisse, like the following ones: 
‘While, originally, the act of social production appeared as the 
positing of exchange values and this, in its later development, 
as circulation […] now, circulation itself returns back into the 
activity which posits or produces exchange values. It returns 
into it as into its ground. […] We have therefore reached the 
point of departure again, production which posits, creates 
exchange values; but this time, production which presupposes 
circulation as a developed moment and which appears as a 
constant process, which posits circulation and constantly 
returns from it into itself in order to posit it anew’.41 
This captures Marx’s Hegelian understanding of the previously mentioned 
dialectical inseparability of circulation and production: 
‘Production itself is here no longer present in advance 
of its products, i.e. presupposed; it rather appears as 
simultaneously bringing forth these results; but it does not 
bring them forth, as in the first stage, as merely leading into 
circulation but as simultaneously presupposing circulation, 
the developed process of circulation’.42 
41 Marx 1993, p. 255.
42 Ibid, p. 256.
Marx uses the example of commercial relations between England and the 
Netherlands in the 16th century, where the import of Dutch commodities in 
exchange for wool forced England to produce a surplus: 
‘In order then to produce more wool, cultivated land was 
transformed into sheep-walks, the system of small tenant-
farmers was broken up etc., clearing of estates took place etc. 
Agriculture thus lost the character of labour for use value, 
and the exchange of its overflow lost the character of relative 
indifference in respect to the inner construction of production. 
At certain points, agriculture itself became purely determined 
by circulation, transformed into production for exchange 
value. Not only was the mode of production altered thereby, 
but also all the old relations of population and of production, 
the economic relations which corresponded to it, were 
dissolved. Thus, here was a circulation which presupposed 
a production in which only the overflow was created as 
exchange value; but it turned into a production which took 
place only in connection with circulation, a production which 
posited exchange values as its exclusive content’.43
The alteration of the mode of production described by Marx 
resonates very closely with Lacan’s claim that what caused the passage 
from the Master’s discourse to that of the Capitalist and of the University 
(modern science), was a structural shift affecting the substance of 
labour (production). As Marx underlines against the classical political 
economists, capital is not simply money exchanged for labour. On 
the contrary, it is a social relation, and as such it constitutes itself 
dialectically. This means that if to comprehend capital it is necessary 
to start with money, money in its ‘abstract generality’44 must first be 
negated. Money exchanged for labour is not the same as money in 
circulation, where it appears as ‘a simple positing of equivalents’.45 
Rather, when it returns to itself, i.e. as capital, money becomes a process, 
a self-valorising capacity through its dialectical relation with labour – 
Marx calls this capacity vervielfältigen seiner selbst, a “reproduction of 
itself”. The dialectical relationship entertained with labour is thus the 
“magical” point where money, from a rigid and tangible thing that aims 
to become immortal by withdrawing from circulation, becomes capital. 
In respect of this dialectical liaison, Marx is very clear on the reciprocal 
alienness of labour and capital in its money-form: 
43 Ibid, p. 257.
44 Ibid, p. 263.
45 Ibid.
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‘Let us analyse first the simple aspects contained in the relation 
of capital and labour […]. The first presupposition is that capital 
stands on one side and labour on the other, both as independent 
forms relative to each other; both hence also alien to one 
another’.46
 
This mutual alienness, however, is not mere indifference. It is, rather, 
a dialectical opposition, in the precise sense that capital is different 
from labour only insofar as it relates to it – and the same goes for labour. 
They therefore constitute a unit through the interaction of their specific 
contradiction. Delving deeper into the essence of this contradiction, Marx 
discusses two types of labour: objectified labour and non-objectified labour. 
The first exists in space, i.e. as the congealed amount of labour contained 
in the commodity and equivalent to a given amount of money. The second 
exists in time, i.e. as the living labour of the worker: 
‘If it is to be present in time, alive, then it can be present only as 
the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility; 
hence as worker. […] Labour as mere performance of services 
for the satisfaction of immediate needs has nothing whatever to 
do with capital, since that is not capital’s concern’.47 
It is this labour as subjective capacity, as non-capital, which is appropriated 
by money, and turned into objectified (abstract) labour: ‘Capital exchanges 
itself, or exists in this role, only in connection with not-capital, the negation 
of capital, without which it is not capital; the real not-capital is labour’.48 To 
become capital, then, money must first posit labour as its other, as not-
capital. By the same token, to become the living source of capital, labour 
must first be “pure capacity”, the Aristotelian potential to work (dynamei 
on) which is not yet mediated by capital. 
The Hegelian point to highlight here is that what connects capital 
and labour as incongruous entities is their inherent inconsistency (self-
relating negativity). That is to say: the difference between the two 
oppositional entities in question is also their own self-difference, their own 
impossibility to be, autonomously, “capital” and “labour”. Each, in other 
words, contains within itself its non-being, and what brings them together 
is the act of mediation (fictionalisation) of this intrinsic negativity. The 
distance between capital and labour is the distance of labour from itself, 
its self-relating negativity; and it is also the difference of capital from 
itself, which, as I have argued, fuels capital’s drive qua automatic subject. 
46 Ibid, p. 266.
47 Ibid, p. 272.
48 Ibid, p. 274.
As with Hegel’s dialectic of subject and substance, what brings the two 
together is their positivized/mediated negativity, which takes the form of the 
value-fetish.49 This is how capital turns the relation to its other (labour) into 
selfčrelating qua movement of selfčexpansion. That is to say, it retroactively 
sublates its own conditions of possibility by mediating them into moments 
of its own “spontaneous” self-reproduction. By doing so, capital posits 
its own presuppositions: it creates its principle of self-valorisation out of 
the contradiction between itself and labour. But to what extent is Marx 
able to follow the Hegelian dialectic to the end, namely to the self-relating 
negativity of the cause? For Žižek, Marx in unable to reach this point: 
‘the problem is how to think together the Hegelian circulation 
of capital and its decentered cause, the labour force, that is, 
how to think the causality of a productive subject external to 
the circulation of capital without resorting to the Aristotelian 
positivity of workers’ productive potential? For Marx, the starting 
point is precisely such a positivity: the productive force of human 
labor; and he accepts this starting point as unsurpassable, 
rejecting the logic of the dialectical process which, as Hegel put 
it, progresses “from nothing through nothing to nothing”’.50
It is because Marx’s ultimate horizon is the affirmative character of labour 
that, as Žižek notes, ‘Marx’s reference to Hegel’s dialectics in his “critique 
of political economy” is ambiguous, oscillating between taking it as a 
mystified expression of the logic of capital and taking it as a model for the 
revolutionary process of emancipation’.51 For Lacan, Marx’s ambiguity vis-à-
vis labour did not prevent him from designating ‘the function of surplus value 
[…] with complete pertinence in its devastating consequences’, and yet it 
also meant that the limit of his critique resides in accepting the ontological 
presuppositions of the scientific-cum-capitalist discourse of his time:
‘If, by means of this relentlessness to castrate himself that he 
had, he hadn’t computed this surplus jouissance, if he hadn’t 
converted it into surplus value, in other words if he hadn’t 
founded capitalism, Marx would have realized that surplus value 
is surplus jouissance.’52
49 What comes to mind here is Lacan’s notion of sexual difference, where the impossibility of the rela-
tionship is sustained by a particular fantasy, a fictional formula whose purpose is to bridge the universal 
gap of sexuality.
50 Žižek 2013, p. 251.
51 Ibid, p. 250.
52 Lacan 2007, pp. 107-08.
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The limit of Marx’s labour theory of value, steeped as it is in the 
positivist economicism of his time, lies in its failure fully to accomplish 
the step from value as positive ground to value as the grounding gap or 
inconsistency that triggers the dialectical self-deployment of the capitalist 
dynamic. Hegel’s dialectical approach allows us to dispel the illusion that 
the external obstacle (the capitalist exploitation of labour) thwarts the 
potential inherent to non-alienated labour, preventing it from realizing 
itself in a communist/utopian scenario. In respect of this misleading 
binary logic, the Hegelian lesson is that a given ontic potential, such as 
the potential of human “knowledge at work”, is always consubstantial, or 
speculatively identical with, the contradiction or negativity that qualifies 
its historically deployed ontological essence. What should be emphasises, 
dialectically speaking, is the self-relating negativity of labour, and by the 
same token the self-relating negativity of the “discourse of the Capitalist” 
as a socio-ontological formation.
Consequently, the nexus between surplus labour-time and surplus-
value needs to be redefined. The presupposition of capital positing itself 
as an autotelic discourse is not merely the exploitation of labour-power 
as source of surplus-value. If we stop at this conclusion we risk missing 
the missing cause of the whole process. Everything rests on grasping 
that what capital presupposes is not just the use-value of labour but the 
fact that labour constitutes the founding contradiction, or determinate 
negation, of capital’s own self-deployment. Radically understood via 
Lacan (and Hegel), labour-power as “substance of capital” is nothing but 
labour-powerlessness, its own self-contradiction; it becomes an affirmative 
(valorised) substance only after capital has posited its presuppositions, 
that is to say after it has turned its insubstantial “nothing”, its ineffable 
quality, into “something”, a quantity of labour-time necessary for the 
production of a given commodity and the reproduction of the worker’s 
livelihood (socially necessary labour-time). Thus, the extraction of surplus-
value from surplus labour-time depends on a retroactive movement 
whereby money turns an unquantifiable “other” into the presupposition 
of its smooth, ever-accelerating discourse as capital. The very fact that 
capitalism coincides with its own acceleration, i.e. that in a stagnant state 
it would perish, is proof that its ontology of self-reproduction is, literally, 
built upon “nothing”. Labour as substance of wealth is therefore the fiction 
that founds capitalism as a social relation. Put differently, the capitalist 
autopoiesis needed to fictionalise labour-power as its cause. This is 
the loop involved in the Hegelian Setzung der Voraussetzungen (positing 
the presuppositions): the self-organisation of the capitalist discourse 
emerged through the positing of the “labour presupposition”, which 
determined the seemingly spontaneous socio-ontological boundary within 
which the capitalist mode of production proliferated. This boundary was 
installed precisely by the minimal narrative concerning the computation of 
the unconscious roots of labour-power.
Historically, we are now at a point where the labour-fiction is 
increasingly untenable, as valorised human labour is being ousted by 
machines and will not be given a second chance. What is evaporating 
before our very eyes is not just labour as substance of value, but labour 
as fiction, that crucial fantasy formation through which labour-power 
was once constituted as constitutive of capital. In this respect, if we fail 
to apply the Hegelian reading on how capital retroactively subsumed the 
inherently self-contradictory status of labour into the engine propelling 
its own mode of production, we will continue to engage in fundamentally 
misleading debates on what to do with capitalist value (e.g. stimulus 
vs. austerity). Labour as presupposition of capital does not have a 
substantial consistency of its own. And Lacan stressed exactly this point 
when he claimed that labour-power originates in unconscious knowledge. 
The task ahead, then, is to insist that in its current terminal phase 
capitalism is increasingly naked, i.e. deprived of its anchoring point in 
its own labour presupposition. When the mask of valorised labour drops, 
the positing of the such presupposition also fails, with catastrophic 
consequences for everyone. 
Capitalism emerged as a dominant discourse only through its 
failure to actualize itself fully: the sublation of labour does not signal 
reconciliation with it, but instead the endless failure of reconciliation 
qua class struggle, which is precisely the contradiction upon which 
capital erects its logic. As anticipated, capital’s relation to labour 
is akin to subject’s relation to substance in Hegel. This is why the 
capitalist positing of the labour presupposition has nothing to do with a 
teleological process: it is not the logical development of human activity 
from something less substantial to something more substantial. What 
is retroactively called into existence (the substantial character of 
labour) was already there prior to the arrival of capitalism. The labouring 
capacity as form-giving activity, interaction with nature and substance 
of wealth was, of course, already at the heart of feudal societies, which 
had posited their own particular labour presupposition. The effect of 
the capitalist revolution was to re-signify the previous substantiality of 
labour by giving it a specific agency through its compulsive quantification 
and commodification. From that moment on, the dividing line between 
capitalist and pre-capitalist notions of human “knowledge at work” was 
obfuscated, and the pre-capitalist past suddenly appeared within the 
teleological framework of capitalist relations. This, however, should not 
prevent us from recognising the self-relating negativity of substance 
(labour) in its speculative identity with the self-relating negativity of 
subject (capital). This, again, means that labour qua substance of capital 
is deeply inconsistent, and it is by identifying and tarrying with such 
inconsistency that the new might emerge – in Lacanian terms, a new 
social link (signifiant nouveau) based in a new relation with surplus-
jouissance.
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